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DAMAGES
MARSHALL T. MAYS*
Excessive Damages
A review of the decisions under Damages in the South
Carolina Digest reveals that during the twenty-three year
period, 1934-1957, there were thirty decisions concerning the
question of excessive damages. In none of these cases were
the damages awarded held to be excessive. During the last
year, however, there were seven cases before the Supreme
Court involving this question. In four' of the seven cases the
trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, had required a re-
mission of part of the verdict rendered by the jury. Three of
these four were affirmed, but in the fourth, Nelson v.
Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co.,2 the Court held
that an award of $29,000.00 (reduced by the trial court from
$35,000.00) was excessive. Of the three remaining cases in
which the trial court gave judgment on the verdict, one3 was
reversed as excessive, and two4 were affirmed.
It would certainly appear from these decisions that there
is an increasing tendency on the part of trial courts to
require remission of a part of an excessive verdict, and a
tendency on the part of the Supreme Court to reverse judg-
ments which it deems excessive. Such a tendency may sur-
prise those members of the bar who feel that juries today
do not appreciate the decreased purchasing power of the
dollar.
The test applied by the Court in all of these cases con-
cerning the reasonableness of the verdict is whether the ver-
dict was so excessive as to warrant the inference that it
*Member of the firm of Mays & Mays, Greenwood; B.S., 1945, U. S.
Naval Academy; LL.B., 1950, University of South Carolina and Harvard
Law School, 1951; member Greenwood, South Carolina and American
Bar Associations.
1. Nelson v. Charleston & W. C. Rwy. Co., 231 S. C. 351, 98 S. E.
2d 798 (1957); Jeffers v. Hardeman, 231 S. C. 578, 99 S. E. 2d 402
(1957) ; Benton v. Pellum, 232 S. C. 26, 100 S. E. 2d 534 (1957) ; Taylor
v. Hardee, 232 S. C. 338, 102 S. E. 2d 218 (1958).
2. Note 1 supra.
3. Winchester v. United Ins. Co., 231 S. C. 462, 99 S. E. 2d 28
(1957).
4. Parnell v. Carolina Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 231 S.. C. 426, 98
S. E. 2d 834 (1957); Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S. C. 565, 99
S. E. 2d 384 (1957).
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was the result of caprice, passion, prejudice or other consid-
erations not founded on the evidence. The most widely ac-
cepted formula for determining whether or not a verdict is
excessive is attributed to Chancellor Kent:
The damages, therefore, must be so excessive as to
strike mankind, at first blush, as being, beyond all mea-
sure, unreasonable, and outrageous, and such as mani-
festly show the jury to have been actuated by passion,
partiality, prejudice, or corruption. In short, the dam-
ages must be flagrantly outrageous and extra-vagant, or
the court cannot undertake to draw the line; for they
have no standard by which to ascertain the excess.5
While using the language of Chancellor Kent, our courts, as
well as those in many other jurisdictions, appear to require
considerably less extravagance on the part of the jury, and
lesser degrees of passion and prejudice, to justify a reversal.
The language of Justice Oxner in the Nelson case, supra, is
indicative of this:
The delicate question is whether the compensation
awarded for these elements [mental suffering and loss of
companionship] is so grossly excessive as to warrant the
inference that it was the result of caprice, passion, pre-
judice or other considerations not founded on the evi-
dence. This phrase like the unhappily framed expression
"abuse of discretion" is frequently misunderstood.0
We have held that the term "abuse of discretion" does
not "carry with it an implication of conduct deserving
censure", and does not imply "any reflection" upon the
person in whom the discretion is vested. So, too, the
phrase "passion and prejudice" does not necessarily imply
bad faith, wrongful purpose or moral delinquency7
Chancellor Kent said that the courts have no standard by
which to ascertain the excess of a verdict, and thus far our
courts appear to have laid down no definite standard. Each
case stands on its peculiar facts and circumstances.
Damages for Breach of Contract
Four cases during the period of this survey dealt with
damages related to breach of contract; all affirmed established
principles of law. Monroe v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.0
5. 15 Am. JUp., Damages § 205 (1938).
6. 231 S. C. at 361, 98 S. E. 2d at 802 (1957).
7. Id. at 362, 98 S. E. 2d at 802.
8. 232 S. C. 363, 102 S. E. 2d 207 (1958).
[Vol. II
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1958], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss1/9
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
followed the well established rule that there must be allega-
tion and proof of actual or nominal damages in order to
sustain a verdict for punitive damages, accordingly a judg-
ment for punitive damages, without actual damages, for
fraudulent breach of an insurance contract was reversed. In
the same decision the Court reasserted in clear language that
there must be a fraudulent act as distinguished from a fraudu-
lent intent to sustain an action for fradulent breach of con-
tract. The same rule was followed in Roberts v. Fore.9
Tate v. LeMaster10 was an action to recover a deposit paid
by the plaintiff to the defendant in a verbal transaction re-
lating to the sale of real estate. The Court held that the trial
court could not as a matter of law rule that the deposit was
"liquidated damages" and not a "penalty" when the de-
fendant in correspondence had referred to the deposit as a
"forfeit". There was apparently no attempt to prove actual
damages.
Punitive Damages
In Green v. Sparks," an action for personal injuries, the
plaintiff attempted to show evidence of defendant's wealth
relevant to punitive damages by introducing evidence that the
defendant had collected damages from Lockhart Power Com-
pany for his personal injuries. The trial court admitted the
evidence, but the Supreme Court held the evidence to be im-
proper and irrelevant to any issue in the case, but recognized
that other evidence of the defendant's wealth would have been
proper.
In one instance, Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers'
Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 2 the U. S. Court of Ap-
peals, 4th Circuit, construed the South Carolina law concern-
ing punitive damages, in an action on an automobile liability
policy which excluded from coverage intentional acts of the
insured. In an opinion by Judge Sobeloff, the court held:
Negligent conduct may be so gross as to merit charac-
terization as willful and wanton in the sense of the rule
for punitive damages, yet fall far short of an assault and
battery which would distinguish it from an accidental
event and withdraw it from the coverage of the policy.
9. 231 S. C. 311, 98 S. E. 2d 766 (1957).
10. 231 S. C. 429, 99 S. E. 2d 39 (1957).
11. 232 S. C. 414,102 S. E. 2d 435 (1958).
12. 244 F. 2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957).
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